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Linear quadratic graphon field games (LQ-GFGs) are defined to be
LQ games which involve a large number of agents that are weakly
coupled via a weighted undirected graph on which each node rep-
resents an agent. The links of the graph correspond to couplings
between the agents’ dynamics, as well as between the individual
cost functions, which each agent attempts to minimize. We formu-
late limit LQ-GFG problems based on the assumption that these
graphs lie in a sequence which converges to a limit graphon. First,
under a finite-rank assumption on the limit graphon, the existence
and uniqueness of solutions to the formulated limit LQ-GFG prob-
lem is established. Second, based upon the solutions to the limit
LQ-GFG problem, ε-Nash equilibria are constructed for the cor-
responding game problems with a very large but finite number of
players. This result is then generalized to the case with random
initial conditions. It is to be noted that LQ-GFG problems are dis-
tinct from the class of graphon mean field game (GMFG) problems
where a population is hypothesized to be associated with each node
of the graph [5, 6].
1. Introduction
Strategic decision problems over very large-scale networks arise in applica-
tions such as 5G communication, large-scale social networks, stock market
networks, advertising networks, electrical networks and so on. However deci-
sion and control problems for such systems require tractable solutions that
are of low computational complexity.
When networks are dense and uniform, the couplings between agents
may appear in their dynamics and performance functions as mean field
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2 S. Gao, R. Foguen Tchuendom and P.E. Caines
terms. In those cases where the population is large, Mean Field Game the-
ory ([18, 21, 23, 24]) may then be applied in order to analyse the possible
Nash equilibria of the overall system. On the other hand, for a large class
of non-uniform networks progress has been made in various directions. Such
work includes, for example, quantilized mean field games ([9, 11, 33]), mean
field games with localities [19] and Graphon Mean Field Game theory [5, 6].
Graphon theory provides an important framework for the study of very
large graphs, convergent sequences of dense graphs and for the construction
and analysis of their limit objects ([3, 4, 26]). The theory has been used
in the analysis of dynamical models such as the heat equation and coupled
oscillators ([8, 27, 28]), network centrality [1], random walks over large dense
graphs [30], the Graphon Control of dynamical systems coupled over very
large-scale networks ([12–16]), and static and dynamic game problems on
graphons [5–7, 29].
The recently developed Graphon Control theory [12–16] employs the
graphon model to represent control systems on arbitrary-sized networks.
This enables the study of control problems for very large-scale network-
coupled dynamical systems and generates low-complexity approximate con-
trol solutions to otherwise intractable problems. The solutions are either
centralized solutions [14] or collaborative solutions [15]. This current work
studies the approximate solutions in a competitive situation.
Graphon Mean Field Game (GMFG) theory was proposed and developed
in [5, 6] wherein a large number of weakly coupled competitive agents are
distributed over a large non-uniform graph, and consequently each agent is
associated with a nodal mean field. Within this framework network wide
Nash equilibria and ε-Nash results have been established in both non-linear
and linear quadratic cases.
Mean field games on networks have appeared in [10, 17, 19]. In [17] the
graph is the state space of the mean-field game problem representing physi-
cal constraints on the state space. While in [10] linear-quadratic mean-field
games over Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graphs are studied where the associated asymptotic
game is a classical mean field game. These formulations are different from
the current work in their assumptions concerning their finite and asymptotic
features. We also note that, similar to [10], in the current work each node
represents an agent and this is different from [5, 6] where each node is asso-
ciated with a population of agents. However, it is worth mentioning that
when the underlying graphons in the current paper are taken to be step
function graphons, the problems on networks with nodal populations can
be equivalently formulated. This work is related to the work in [19] where
mean-field game problems with non-homogeneous dense network weightings
i
i
“Linear˙Quadratic˙Graphon˙Field˙Games” — 2020/6/9 — 1:52 — page 3 — #3 i
i
i
i
i
i
Linear Quadratic Graphon Field Games 3
in the running costs are studied. But it differs from [19] in both the problem
formulation and the solution method.
In the current work, we explicitly solve a class of LQ-GFGs with deter-
ministic dynamics and with random initial conditions by exploiting the spec-
tral decomposition of the underlying graphon limit. Furthermore, the corre-
sponding ε-Nash results are established.
Notation
R represents the space of all real numbers. ‖ · ‖∞ denotes the standard
infinity norm for matrices and vectors, that is, for any matrix A ∈ Rn×n,
‖A‖∞ , maxi
∑
j |aij | and for any vector v ∈ Rn, ‖v‖∞ , maxi |vi|. L2[0, 1]
denotes the standard Lebesgue space over [0, 1] ⊂ R under the ‖ · ‖2-norm
defined by ‖v‖2 = (
∫ 1
0 v(α)
2dα)1/2. We use the upper bound big O nota-
tion in this paper, i.e., O(g) = {f : there exist c > 0 and n0 such that 0 ≤
f(n) ≤ cg(n), ∀n ≥ n0}.
2. Graphons and Graphon Dynamical Systems
Graphs can be considered as models for network couplings. A graph G =
(V,E) is specified by a node set V = {1, ..., N} and an edge set E ⊂ V × V .
The corresponding adjacency matrix A = [aij ] is defined as follows: aij =
1 if (i, j) ∈ E otherwise aij = 0. A graph is undirected if its edge pair is
unordered. For a weighted undirected graph, aij in its adjacency matrix is
given by the weight between nodes i and j. Furthermore an adjacency matrix
can be represented as a pixel diagram on the unit square [0, 1]2 ⊂ R2, which
corresponds to a graphon step function [26].
Graphons are formally defined as symmetric Lebesgue measurable func-
tions A : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1]. The space of graphons endowed with the cut metric
[26] allows us to define meaningful convergence of graph sequences. In this
paper, we consider symmetric Lebesgue measurable functions A : [0, 1]2 →
[−c, c] with c > 0, the space of which is denoted by Wc. The space Wc is
compact under the cut metric after identifying points of cut distance zero
[26]. A graphon A ∈ Wc defines a self-adjoint bounded linear operator from
L2[0, 1] to L2[0, 1] as follows:
[Av](γ) =
∫
[0,1]
A(γ, η)v(η)dη, ∀γ ∈ [0, 1],
where v,Av ∈ L2[0, 1].
i
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Figure 1. Half graphs and its limit graphon [26]
Let L2([0, T ];L2[0, 1]) denote the Banach space of equivalence classes of
strongly measurable (in the Bo¨chner sense [32, p.103]) mappings [0, T ]→
L2[0, 1] that are integrable with norm
‖f‖L2([0,T ];L2[0,1]) =
(∫ T
0
‖f(s)‖22ds
)1/2
The space of continuous functions from [0, T ] to a Hilbert space H is denoted
by C([0, T ];H).
An infinite dimensional time-dependent graphon linear control system
(At;Bt) is formulated as follows:
(1) x˙t = Atxt + Btut, x0 ∈ L2[0, 1], t ∈ [0, T ],
where At = αtI+ A,Bt = βtI+ B with α(·), β(·) ∈ C([0, T ];R), A,B ∈ Wc,
xt ∈ L2[0, 1] is the system state at time t and u(·) ∈ L2([0, T ];L2[0, 1]) is the
control input function over time. Verifying all the conditions in [2, Part II,
Proposition 3.4, 3.6], we obtain that the system (1) is well defined and has
the unique mild (and strong) solution in C([0, T ];L2[0, 1]) given by
(2) xt = Φ(t, 0)x0 +
∫ t
0
Φ(t, τ)Bτuτdτ
where the evolution operator is given by
Φ(t, τ) , exp
(∫ t
τ
αsds
)
· exp((t− τ)A).
Readers are referred to [26] for a thorough exposition of graphon theory
and to [14] for a definitive exposition of graphon control systems and their
relation to finite network control systems.
i
i
“Linear˙Quadratic˙Graphon˙Field˙Games” — 2020/6/9 — 1:52 — page 5 — #5 i
i
i
i
i
i
Linear Quadratic Graphon Field Games 5
3. Deterministic Linear Quadratic Graphon Field Games
We first introduce the deterministic linear quadratic graphon field game
model on a weighted undirected graph, demonstrate the applications of the
spectral decomposition to solve the limit problem, and then establish the
ε-Nash property for finite graphon field game problems.
3.1. Finite Population and Finite Graph Problems
Consider the following linear quadratic graphon field game problem on a
weighted undirected graph with the dynamics for the ith agent given by
(3)
x˙it = αx
i
t + βu
i
t + η
1
N
N∑
j=1
aijx
j
t ,
t ∈ [0, T ], α, β ∈ R, xit, uit ∈ R, i ∈ {1, ..., N},
where AN , [aij ] represents the adjacency matrix of the underlying weighted
undirected graph and {xi0}Ni=1 are initial conditions. The ith agent’s objective
is to minimize its cost given by
(4) J i(ui, u−i) =
1
2
∫ T
0
[(
xit −
1
N
N∑
j=1
aijx
j
t
)2
+ r(uit)
2
]
dt, with r > 0,
where ui ∈ U , L2([0, T ];R) for all i ∈ {1, ..., N}.
Consider the N -uniform partition {P1, . . . , PN} of [0, 1], that is, P1 =
[0, 1N ] and Pk = (
k−1
N ,
k
N ] for 2 ≤ k ≤ N . The step function graphon AN ∈
Wc that corresponds to AN is given by
(5) AN(ϑ, ϕ) =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
1
Pi
(ϑ)1
Pj
(ϕ)aij , (ϑ, ϕ) ∈ [0, 1]2,
where 1
Pi
(·) represents the indicator function, that is, 1
Pi
(ϑ) = 1 if ϑ ∈ Pi
and 1
Pi
(ϑ) = 0 if ϑ /∈ Pi. Let the piece-wise constant function xNt ∈ L2[0, 1]
corresponding to xt , [x10, x20, . . . , xN0 ]
ᵀ ∈ RN be given by
(6) xNt (ϑ) =
N∑
i=1
1
Pi
(ϑ)xit, ∀ϑ ∈ [0, 1].
i
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Similarly, uN , {uNt , t ∈ [0, T ]} can be defined. Based on the construction
procedure, each agent on the finite network is associated with a partition
element in the N -uniform partition of [0, 1].
Define the process zγt ,
∫
[0,1] A
N(γ, α)xNt (α)dα, with γ ∈ Pi ⊂ [0, 1] and
t ∈ [0, T ], as the Local Graphon Field affecting the agent indexed by i. The
process (zγt )t∈[0,T ],γ∈[0,1] is then defined as the Graphon Field.
Clearly in an N -agent problem, the graphon field is given by the piece-
wise constant function zNt that corresponds to the N -dimensional vector
zt , 1NANxt following (6), for all t ∈ [0, T ].
3.2. Solutions to the Limit Problems
Letting the network cardinality go to infinity, the limiting game may be
formulated. Since in the limit the effect of an individual agent on the graphon
field becomes negligible, the resulting minimization problems may be treated
as independent linear quadratic tracking problems.
For the limit problem to be well defined, we need the following assump-
tion.
Assumption 1. There exist A ∈ Wc and x0 ∈ L2[0, 1] such that
(a) lim
N→∞
‖AN −A‖op = 0, (b) lim
N→∞
‖xN0 − x0‖2 = 0,
where ‖ · ‖op denotes the operator norm.
The convergence for the underlying graphons can also be defined in the
cut norm ‖ · ‖ (see e.g. [26]) since the following relation [22, 29] holds:
(7) ‖A‖ ≤ ‖A‖op ≤
√
8‖A‖, ∀A ∈ W1.
The dynamics in equation (3) for all agents can be represented by an
infinite dimensional system equation as in (1) where the graph is represented
by the corresponding step function graphon and the state and the control
are respectively represented by piece-wise constant functions xNt and u
N
t in
L2[0, 1] (see [14]). Under Assumption 1 and the assumption that uN con-
verges to a limit control u in C([0, T ];L2[0, 1]) under the uniform norm, this
representation permits a well-defined limit equation where the convergence
of trajectories is in the space C([0, T ];L2[0, 1]) under the uniform norm fol-
lowing a slight extension of the result in [14, Theorem 7]. Then for almost all
γ ∈ [0, 1], we can and shall write the evolution of the γ component system
as in (8) below where the family of local mean fields satisfies (10) below.
i
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Linear Quadratic Graphon Field Games 7
A Nash equilibrium for the infinite population LQ Graphon Field Game
associated with a limit of the system (3) and individual performance func-
tions (4) is characterized as follows:
(C1) Best Response
For a given local graphon field (zγt )t∈[0,T ], let the best response uγ,∗ for
the agent indexed by γ ∈ [0, 1] be given by the solution to the linear
tracking problem with the controlled linear dynamics
(8)
x˙γt = αx
γ
t + βu
γ
t + ηz
γ
t , x
γ
0 = x
γ
0 ,
t ∈ [0, T ], α, β ∈ R, xγt ,uγt ∈ R,
for almost all γ ∈ [0, 1], with the performance function
(9) J(uγ , zγ) =
1
2
∫ T
0
(
(xγt − zγt )2 + r(uγt )2
)
dt,
where uγ,∗ = arg infuγ∈U J(uγ , zγ).
(C2) Consistency or Equilibrium Condition
Given state trajectories (xγ,∗,zt )t∈[0,T ] under the best response control
uγ,∗, the local graphon fields (zγt )t∈[0,T ] satisfy the consistency condi-
tions:
(10) ∀t ∈ [0, T ], zγt = [Ax∗,zt ]γ
for almost every γ ∈ [0, 1] where x∗,zt , (xγ,∗,zt )γ∈[0,1].
We note that a related notion of a local mean field appears in [5, 6].
A procedure to find an equilibrium solution to the infinite population
infinite graphon problem presented in (C1) and (C2) above is as follows.
Best Response. The best response solution to the above linear quadratic
tracking problem is given by (see e.g. [25])
uγt = −
β
r
pitx
γ
t +
β
r
sγt ,(11)
−p˙it = 2αpit − β
2
r
pi2t + 1, piT = 0,(12)
−s˙γt =
(
α− β
2
r
pit
)
sγt + (1− ηpit)zγt , sγT = 0,(13)
for almost all γ ∈ [0, 1]. The stars in the notations are being dropped hence-
forth. Consequently the closed loop state equation for the agent indexed by
i
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γ is given by
(14) x˙γt =
(
α− β
2
r
pit
)
xγt + ηz
γ
t +
β2
r
sγt , x
γ
0 = x
γ
0 ,
for almost all γ ∈ [0, 1].
Consistency or Equilibrium Condition. In the space L2([0, T ], L2[0, 1]),
we search for the Graphon Field z and the off-set term s that ensure the
consistency condition holds. We now invoke Assumption 1 and observe that
an application of A on each side of (14) yields that the consistency condi-
tion (10) is equivalent to the existence of a unique solution to the following
infinite dimensional ordinary differential equations over [0, T ],
(15)
z˙t =
(
α− β
2
r
pit
)
zt + ηAzt +
β2
r
Ast, z0 = Ax0,
−s˙t =
(
α− β
2
r
pit
)
st + (1− ηpit)zt, sT = 0.
Each of the two equations above given the solution to the other is well defined
following Section 2. Assumption 1 ensures that the solution to each of the
equations in (15) is the limit of solutions in the L2([0, T ], L2[0, 1]) sense to
the sequences of equations corresponding to the finite network problems,
when all solutions exist. Based on Section 2, if the solutions z and s exist in
L2([0, T ];L2[0, 1]), they must also lie in C([0, T ];L2[0, 1]).
Next, we derive the sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness
of the solutions to the joint forward backward problem in (15).
Assumption 2. The graphon limit admits a finite spectral representation
A =
∑d
`=1 λ`f`f
ᵀ
` , where {λ`}d`=1 is the set of all the non-zero eigenvalues
and {f`}d`=1 is corresponding set of orthonormal eigenfunctions.
Under this assumption, zγt = [Axt]
γ =
∑d
`=1 λ`〈f`,xt〉f`(γ), in the L2[0, 1]
sense and from (15) in the eigendirection f`, ` ∈ {1, ..., d}, we obtain
(16)
z˙`t =
(
α− β
2
r
pit + ηλ`
)
z`t +
β2
r
λ`s
`
t, z
`
0 = 〈z0, f`〉 = λ`〈x0, f`〉,
s˙`t = −
(
α− β
2
r
pit
)
s`t − (1− ηpit)z`t , s`T = 0,
over the interval [0, T ], where z`t = 〈zt, f`〉 and s`t = 〈st, f`〉.
i
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Linear Quadratic Graphon Field Games 9
From (15), it may be verified that the projections of zt and st into
the subspace S⊥ (that is, the complementary subspace orthogonal to S ,
span{f1, ..., fd}) are zero for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Therefore, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
(17) zt =
d∑
`=1
z`t f` and st =
d∑
`=1
s`tf`.
Following [31], we associate the solvability of problems (16) to the solv-
ability of Riccati equations.
Assumption 3. For any λ`, ` ∈ {1, . . . , d}, there exists a solution to the
Riccati equation
−Π˙`t =
[
2
(
α− β
2
r
pit
)
+ ηλ`
]
Π`t +
β2
r
λ`(Π
`
t)
2 + (1− ηpit), Π`T = 0,(18)
over the interval [0, T ], where pi(·) is the solution to the Riccati equation in
(12).
Note that finite escape time may appear for the solutions to the Ric-
cati equation above depending on the parameters and the time horizon, in
particular when λ` > 0.
Under Assumption 3, for each λ`, the solution to the Riccati equation
(18) is unique due to the smoothness of the right-hand side with respect to
Π`t (see [31]). Let q
`
t , Π`tz`t . Then
(19)
d
(
q`t − s`t
)
dt
= −
[(
α− β
2
r
pit
)
+
β2
r
λ`Π
`
t
]
(q`t − s`t)
with the terminal condition (q`T − s`T ) = 0. Solving this ordinary differential
equation (ODE) allows us to conclude that s`t , Π`tz`t for all t ∈ [0, T ] (see
also [31]). Replacing s`t in the forward equation of (16) by Π
`
tz
`
t , we obtain
(20) z˙`t =
[
α+
β2
r
(Π`tλ` − pit) + ηλ`
]
z`t , z
`
0 = λ`〈x0, f`〉.
An alternative approach to establish the sufficient condition for the exis-
tence of a unique solution to the problem (15) is given below where the
counterpart of Assumption 3 is a contraction condition in (21). The relation
between the two sufficient conditions shall be analyzed in future work.
i
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10 S. Gao, R. Foguen Tchuendom and P.E. Caines
Proposition 1 (Appendix 7.1). Under Assumption 2, the two-point bound-
ary value problem (15) has a unique solution if the following condition holds
for all ` ∈ {1, . . . , d}:
(21)
∫ T
0
β2
r
|λ`|
B`(τ)
∫ T
τ
|(1− ηpis)|B`(s)dsdτ < 1
where B`(t) = exp
[∫ t
0
(
α− β2r piτ + ηλ`
)
dτ − ∫ Tt (α− β2r piτ)dτ] and pi(·) is
the solution to the Riccati equation in (12).
The eigenvalues represent the amplitude of the network influences, which
relate directly to the sufficient condition (21) for the existence of a unique
solution to the fixed-point equation (15).
Theorem 1 (Finite-Rank LQ-GFG Equations for Limit Problems).
Under Assumptions 1, 2 & 3, the equilibrium solution to the limit graphon
field game problem is explicitly given by
(22) uγt = −
β
r
pitx
γ
t +
β
r
d∑
`=1
s`tf`(γ), for almost all γ ∈ [0, 1],
where for all ` ∈ {1, ..., d}, t ∈ [0, T ],
s`t = Π
`
tz
`
t ,(23)
−p˙it = 2αpit − β
2
r
pi2t + 1, piT = 0,(24)
−Π˙`t =
[
2
(
α− β
2
r
pit
)− ηλ`]Π`t + β2r λ`(Π`t)2 + (1− ηpit), Π`T = 0,(25)
z˙`t =
[
α+
β2
r
(Π`tλ` − pit) + ηλ`
]
z`t , z
`
0 = λ`〈x0, f`〉.(26)
Sequentially solving (24), (25) and (26) yields the offest term as in (23).
Thus this procedure provides an explicit hierarchical decoupling (from pi(·)
to Π` to z`) of the joint equations in (16).
Remark 1. The initial condition for z`0 depends on the labeling of the
network, since it is given by z`0 = λ`〈x0, f`〉. This means that s` and hence
the best response depend on the labeling. Therefore, the labeling should be
fixed in the first step to generate the best response law.
i
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Linear Quadratic Graphon Field Games 11
Remark 2. Although the rank of the underlying graphon limit is assumed
to be finite, the limit graphon field game problem still involves an infinite
number of agents.
It it worth mentioning that any finite graph can be represented by a
step function graphon (which is a special case of finite-rank graphons) and
hence any finite agent problem can be reformulated in an infinite dimensional
space based on graphons and L2[0, 1] functions. However, the exact solution
cannot be given by the Finite-Rank Graphon Field Game Equations (22),
(23), (24), (25) and (26) (with a simple replacement of the graphon limit by
a step function), since in this case each individual is no longer negligible to
the evolution of the graphon field. One needs to differentiate a limit graphon
which happens to be a step function and a finite network step function based
on the number of agents in the game problem.
3.3. ε-Nash Property for Finite Problems
In this section, ε-Nash equilibrium is constructed from the limit LQ-GFG
solution for the corresponding large (but finite) population games.
Definition 1. An N -tuple of strategies (u1, ..., uN ) generates an ε-Nash
equilibrium (ε > 0) if the following holds
J(ui, u−i) ≤ inf
vi∈U
J(vi, u−i) + ε
for each i ∈ {1, ..., N}, where U , L2([0, T ],R), J(ui, u−i) denotes the cost
for agent i when all the agents employ the strategies in (u1, ..., uN ), and
J(vi, u−i) denotes the cost for agent i when it deviates unilaterally by taking
response law vi.
Let xN0 be the piece-wise constant function with the N -uniform partition
of [0, 1] corresponding to x0 = [x
1
0, . . . , x
N
0 ]
ᵀ.
Strategy 1 (Finite Problem Strategies: Deterministic Case). Let
the N -tuple (uo1, ..., uoN ) of strategies be constructed as follows: for any
agent i ∈ {1, ..., N},
(27)
uoit = −
β
r
pitx
oi
t +
β
r
s¯it
s¯it ,
1
µ(Pi)
∫
Pi
sγdγ =
d∑
`=1
s`t
1
µ(Pi)
∫
Pi
f`(γ)dγ,
i
i
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where pi(·) and {s`t}d`=1 are generated from the limit LQ-GFG solutions (23),
(24), (25) and (26), the initial conditions for (26) are given by z`0 = λ0〈xN0 , f`〉,
` ∈ {1, . . . , d}, xoit denotes the state of agent i at time t, and µ(Pi) denotes
the size of Pi (which is 1/N for the case with the N -uniform partition).
We now present sufficient conditions under which the N -tuple of strate-
gies (uoi)Ni=1 indeed generates an ε-Nash equilibrium, for the corresponding
large (but finite) population games.
Assumption 4. For all i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, aii = 0, and there exists c > 0 such
that |aij | ≤ c.
Let AN be the corresponding step function of the N ×N adjacency
matrix AN = [aij ] of the underlying graph, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N.
Assumption 5. The sequence {AN}∞N=1 and its limit graphon A satisfy
(28) max
i∈1,...,N
1
µ(Pi)
∥∥(A−AN)1Pi∥∥2 → 0, as N →∞,
where {P1, . . . PN} forms an N -uniform partition of [0, 1] and 1Pi ∈ L2[0, 1]
represents the piece-wise constant function with 1 in Pi and 0 elsewhere.
We now present the ε-Nash property for the finite problem which is
established in Appendix 7.2 following the procedure in [20].
Theorem 2 (Appendix 7.2). Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3 & 4, the fol-
lowing holds for any agent i ∈ {1, ..., N}
(29) J(u
oi, u−oi)− inf
ui∈U
J(ui, u−oi) ∼ max{O(EN ), O(E2N )}
where
EN , max
i∈{1,...,N}
1
µ(Pi)
∥∥(A−AN)1Pi∥∥2 ;
furthermore, if Assumption 5 also holds, then for any ε > 0 there exists N0
such that for any N > N0 the following holds
(30) J(uoi, u−oi) ≤ inf
u∈U
J(ui, u−oi) + ε,
that is (uo1, ..., uoN ) generates an ε-Nash equilibrium for N > N0.
i
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4. Random Initial Conditions
An N -agent game problem with network interactions is formulated as fol-
lows:
(31) x˙it = αx
i
t + βu
i
t + η
1
N
N∑
j=1
aijx
j
t , t ∈ [0, T ], α, β ∈ R, i ∈ {1, ..., N}
where xi0 ∼ N(µ, σ2) and {xi0}Ni=1 are independent. The objective of the ith
agent is the minimization of the performance function given by
(32) J i(ui, u−i) =
1
2
E
∫ T
0
[(
xit −
1
N
N∑
j=1
aijx
j
t
)2
+ r(uit)
2
]
dt.
where r > 0 and [aij ] is the adjacency matrix of the underlying weighted
undirected graph.
4.1. Limit Function for Initial Conditions
Definition 2. Consider a sequence of Gaussian random variables {x10, x20, ...}.
Let xN0 be the stochastic step function corresponding to the vector (x
1
0, x
2
0, . . . , x
N
0 )
ᵀ.
A function x0 ∈ L2[0, 1] is the limit function of the sequence {xN0 }∞N=1 if
∀v ∈ L2[0, 1], 〈x0,v〉 = lim
N→∞
〈xN0 ,v〉
in the mean square sense, which we denote by x0 , limN→∞ xN0 .
For any basis function f` in an orthonormal base system for L
2[0, 1], we
obtain
lim
N→∞
〈xN0 , f`〉 = lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
v¯`(i)x
i
0
where
v¯` ,
[ 1
µ(P1)
〈1P1 , f`〉, ...,
1
µ(PN )
〈1PN , f`〉
]ᵀ
=
[ 1
µ(P1)
〈1P1 , f¯`〉, ...,
1
µ(PN )
〈1PN , f¯`〉
]ᵀ
with f¯` as the stepfunction approximation of f` based on N -uniform parti-
tions of [0, 1]. By the contraction property in [14, Proposition 3], we obtain
‖f¯`‖2 ≤ ‖f‖2 = 1. Therefore ‖v¯`‖2 ,
√
v¯ᵀ` v¯` =
√
N‖f¯`‖2 ≤
√
N.
i
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Let SN , 〈xN0 , f`〉 = 〈xN0 , f¯`〉 = 1N
∑N
i=1 v¯`(i)x
i
0. Clearly,
SN ∼ N
(
µ
1
N
N∑
i=1
v¯`(i), σ
2 1
N2
N∑
i=1
(v¯`(i))
2
)
.
The expectation satisfies
(33) lim
N→∞
E
[
SN
]
= lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
f¯`(i)µ = 〈µ1, f〉
and the variance satisfies var(SN ) ∼ O
(
1/N
)
. Therefore, limN→∞〈xN0 , f`〉 =
〈µ1, f`〉, in the mean square sense, that is, limN→∞ xN0 , µ1.
A natural choice for the limit of the initial condition is µ1. Recall that
f¯` is the approximation of f` based on N -uniform partition of [0, 1] with N
as the size of the finite population game. Hence it is obvious that 〈µ1, f`〉 =
〈µ1, f¯`〉.
4.2. The ε-Nash Property
Based on the solution to the limit LQ-GFG problem with random initial
conditions, the following strategy can be constructed.
Strategy 2 (Finite Problem Strategies: Random Initial Condi-
tions). Let the N -tuple (uo1, ..., uoN ) of strategies be constructed as follows:
(34)
uoit = −
β
r
pitx
oi
t +
β
r
s¯it
s¯it ,
1
µ(Pi)
∫
Pi
sγdγ =
d∑
`=1
s`t
1
µ(Pi)
∫
Pi
f`(γ)dγ,
where s`t = Π
`
tz
`
t ,
−p˙it = 2αpit − β
2
r
pi2t + 1, piT = 0, t ∈ [0, T ],(35)
−Π˙`t =
[
2
(
α− β
2
r
pit
)
− ηλ`
]
Π`t +
β2
r
λ`(Π
`
t)
2 + (1− ηpit), Π`T = 0,(36)
z˙`t =
[
α+
β2
r
(Π`tλ` − pit) + ηλ`
]
z`t , z
`
0 = λ`〈µ1, f`〉.(37)
i
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and µ(Pi) denotes the size of Pi (which is 1/N for the case with the N -
uniform partition).
Compared to the deterministic case, the only difference in the strategies
is the choice of the initial conditions. In this case, each agent only needs to
take into account the expectation of the initial conditions in (37) to compute
the offset terms {s`}d`=1. Thus this provides a decentralized solution.
Theorem 3 (Appendix 7.3). Under Assumptions 1(a), 2, 3 & 4, the
following holds for any agent i
(38)
J(uoi, u−oi)− inf
ui∈U
J(ui, u−oi) ∼ max
{
O
( 1√
N
)
, O
(
EN
)
, O
(
E2N
)}
based on Strategy 2, where
EN , max
i∈{1,...,N}
1
µ(Pi)
∥∥(A−AN)1Pi∥∥2 ;
furthermore, if Assumption 5 also holds, then for any ε > 0 there exists N0
such that for any N > N0 the following holds
(39) J(uoi, u−oi) ≤ inf
u∈U
J(ui, u−oi) + ε,
that is (uo1, ..., uoN ) is an ε-Nash equilibrium for N > N0.
5. Numerical Examples
The following values will be adopted for the parameters: α = −0.5, β = 1,
η = 0.1, r = 10, T = 4. The initial conditions {x10, x20..., } chosen as indepen-
dent Gaussian random variables with variance 1 and mean 10.
5.1. Example on Multipartite Graphs
We consider multipartite graphs (with no self-loops) where the connection
weights are specified by the following matrix
(40)
0.25 0 0.020 0 0.07
0.02 0.07 0.40
 .
The sizes of the sequence of graphs are given by 3n where n ∈ {1, 2, ...} is the
number of nodes in each community. Since n may vary, the underlying graph
i
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(a) State (b) GFG best response (c) Offset process s
(d) Graphon field z (e) Empirical graphon
field
(f) Graphon field estimate
error
(g) Graph structure and its pixel representation
0 20 40 60 80 100
Individual Index
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
Co
st
LQ-GFG Individual Cost
(h) Individual cost
Figure 2. Graphon field game simulation for systems on weighted multi-
partite graphs of size 90 with weights among and within the communities
given by (40), where each community contains 30 nodes. We choose a prob-
lem with 90 nodes in this example for the convenience of illustrating the
network structure, but the method could deal with problems of much large
sizes.
could be of arbitrary size. Clearly Assumptions 1(a), 4 and 5 are satisfied.
Since the graphon limit has rank 3, Assumption 2 holds. Furthermore, the
specific values for the parameters in the example allow Assumption 3 to hold.
Hence, the result in Theorem 3 applies. A simulation result on a network of
size 90 is shown in Figure 2.
i
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5.2. Example on Graphs Generated from a Sinusoidal Graphon
To generate a graph of size N from the graphon limit A(x, y) = 0.5 cos(x−
y) + 0.5 with x, y ∈ [0, 1], we first get the uniform grid in [0, 1] with grid
points p1, ..., pN and then connect i and j (i 6= j) with weight A(pi, pj).
Clearly this generation procedure ensures Assumptions 1(a), 4 and 5 are
satisfied. Since the graphon limit A(x, y) = 0.5 cos(x− y) + 0.5 has rank 3,
Assumption 2 holds. Furthermore, the specific values for the parameters in
the example allow Assumption 3 to hold. Hence, the result in Theorem 3
applies. A simulation result is shown in Figure 3.
6. Conclusions
Future work will be focused on the following LQ-GFG problem areas: (1) LQ-
GFG problems where the agent dynamics include stochastic disturbances;
(2) LQ-GFG problems based on sampling procedures; (3) less restrictive
conditions for the LQ-GMG ε-Nash property; (4) an LQ-GFG methodology
for sparse networks; (5) convergence properties of finite equilibria to the
limit equilibrium.
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7. Appendix
7.1. Proof of Proposition 1
The proof follows immediately from the standard fixed point method and
we include it here for convenience of reference.
Proof. Consider the following transformation:
z˜`t = z
`
texp
[
−
∫ t
0
(
α− β
2
r
piτ + ηλ`
)
dτ
]
s˜`t = s
`
texp
[
−
∫ T
t
(
α− β
2
r
piτ
)
dτ
]
.
(41)
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From (16), we obtain
(42)
˙˜z`t =
β2λ`
r
1
B`(t)
s˜`t, z˜
`
0 = z
`
0
˙˜s`t = −(1− ηpit)B`(t)z˜`t , s˜`T = s`T = 0
where B`(t) , exp
[∫ t
0
(
α− β2r piτ + ηλ`
)
dτ − ∫ Tt (α− β2r piτ)dτ] . Note that
B`(t) > 0 holds for all t ∈ [0, T ]. In a compact form, we have
(43)
[
˙˜z`t
˙˜s`t
]
=
[
0 β
2
r
λ`
B`(t)
−(1− ηpit)B`(t) 0
][
z˜`t
s˜`t
]
,
[
z˜`0
s˜`T
]
=
[
z`0
s`T
]
.
Let Tg and Tb be linear mappings from C([0, T ];R) to C([0, T ];R) defined
as:
(44)
Tg(x)(t) = z`0 +
∫ t
0
β2
r
λ`
B`(τ)
x(τ)dτ,
Tb(x)(t) = 0 +
∫ T
t
(1− ηpiτ )B`(τ)x(τ)dτ, t ∈ [0, T ]
for all x ∈ C([0, T ];R).
Consider the mappingM : C([0, T ];R)→ C([0, T ];R) defined by the com-
position of Tg and Tb as follows: M : x 7→ Tg(Tb(x)), x ∈ C([0, T ];R). We
consider the Banach space of continuous functions C([0, T ];R) endowed with
the sup norm ‖x‖∞ = supt∈[0,T ] |x(t)| for any x ∈ C([0, T ];R). To show the
existence of a unique fixed point to (42), we shall identify a condition for
which the following holds:
(45) ‖M(x)−M(y)‖∞ ≤ L‖x− y‖∞, L < 1.
For t, τ ∈ [0, T ],
(46)
|M(x)(t)−M(y)(t)| =
∣∣∣∣∫ t
0
β2
r
λ`
B`(τ)
(
Tb(x)(τ)− Tb(y)(τ)
)
dτ
∣∣∣∣
≤
∫ t
0
β2
r
|λ`|
B`(τ)
(∣∣Tb(x)(τ)− Tb(y)(τ)∣∣)dτ,
i
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(47)
∣∣∣Tb(x)(τ)− Tb(y)(τ)∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣∫ T
τ
(1− ηpis)B`(s)(x(s)− y(s))ds
∣∣∣∣
≤
∫ T
τ
|(1− ηpis)|B`(s)ds‖x− y‖∞.
Therefore,
(48)
‖M(x)−M(y)‖∞ ≤
∫ T
0
β2
r
|λ`|
B`(τ)
(∫ T
τ
|(1− ηpis)|B`(s)ds
)
dτ‖x− y‖∞.
Hence we obtain the following sufficient condition for a unique fixed point:
(49)
∫ T
0
β2
r
|λ`|
B`(τ)
∫ T
τ
|(1− ηpis)|B`(s)dsdτ < 1.
For (15), the fixed point condition needs to be satisfied for all eigendi-
rections. Therefore we obtain the result. 
7.2. Proof of Theorem 2
We define the following functions: for t, τ ∈ [0, T ],
ANc (t) ,
[
(α− β
2
r
pit)I +
η
N
AN
]
(50)
Φ(t, τ) , exp
(∫ t
τ
ANc (s)ds
)
(51)
Γ(t, τ) , exp
(∫ t
τ
(α− β
2
r
pis)ds
)
.(52)
Clearly Φ(t, τ) = Γ(t, τ)exp
(
η(t−τ)
N AN
)
, where the first part Γ(t, τ) is just
a scalar and the second part exp
(
η(t−τ)
N AN
)
is a N ×N matrix. The same
definitions are also used in Appendix section 7.3.
Proof. Let zγt ,
∑d
`=1 z
`
t f`(γ), γ ∈ [0, 1], be the local graphon field calcu-
lated based on (26) and zγ denote its trajectory over time [0, T ]. Denote the
N -uniform partition of [0, 1] by {P1, ..., PN}. For Pi ⊂ [0, 1], let
z¯it ,
1
µ(Pi)
∫
Pi
zγt dγ ∈ R and z¯γt , z¯it, γ ∈ Pi
Their trajectories over time [0, T ] are respectively denoted by z¯i and z¯.
Similarly we define s¯t, s¯
i
t, s¯ and s¯
i.
i
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For agent i corresponding to Pi ⊂ [0, 1], the cost induced by following
the infinite population and graphon limit Nash law in Strategy 1 is given by
J(uoi, u−oi) =
1
2
∫ T
0
(
(xoit −
1
N
N∑
j=1
aijx
oj
t )
2 + r(uoit )
2
)
dt
= J(uoi, z¯i) +
1
2
∫ T
0
[
(z¯it −
1
N
N∑
j=1
aijx
oj
t )
]2
(uoi,u−oi)
dt
+
∫ T
0
[
(xoit − z¯it)(z¯it −
1
N
N∑
j=1
aijx
oj
t )
]
(uoi,u−oi)
dt
, J(uoi, z¯i) + 1
2
I2 +
1
2
I3,
where xoit and u
oi
t represent respectively the state and the action for agent i
at time t under the prescribed ε-Nash law. We use (uoi, u−oi) in the subscript
to indicate the underlying strategy. By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we
obtain
(53) I3 ≤ 2
√
I2
[∫ T
0
(xoit − z¯it)2dt
] 1
2
(uoi,u−oi)
.
Similarly, we obtain
J(ui, u−oi) =
1
2
∫ T
0
(
(xit −
1
N
N∑
j=1
aijx
j
t )
2 + r(uit)
2
)
(ui,u−oi)
dt
=
1
2
∫ T
0
[
(xit − z¯it)2 + r(uit)2
]
dt+
1
2
∫ T
0
[
(z¯it −
1
N
N∑
j=1
aijx
j
t )
]2
(ui,u−oi)
dt
+
∫ T
0
[
(xit − z¯it)(z¯it −
1
N
N∑
j=1
aijx
j
t )
]
(ui,u−oi)
dt
, J(ui, z¯i) + 1
2
I ′2 +
1
2
I ′3.
and
(54) I ′3 ≤ 2
√
I ′2
[∫ T
0
(xit − z¯it)2dt
] 1
2
(ui,u−oi)
.
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Therefore, we obtain the following:
(55)
J(uoi, u−oi)− J(ui, u−oi)
= J(uoi, u−oi)− J(uoi, z¯i) + J(uoi, z¯i)− J(ui, z¯i) + J(ui, z¯i)− J(ui, u−oi)
≤ 1
2
(I2 + I3) +
(
J(uoi, z¯i)− J(ui, z¯i))+ 1
2
(I ′2 + I
′
3).
7.2.1. Estimate for I2. The next step is to show the upper bound for
the term I2:
(56) I2 ,
∫ T
0
[
(z¯it −
1
N
N∑
j=1
aijx
oj
t )
]2
(uoi,u−oi)
dt.
Based on (15), we obtain
˙¯zit =
(
α− β
2
r
pit
)
z¯it + η
1
µ(Pi)
∫
Pi
[Azt]
γdγ(57)
+
β2
r
1
µ(Pi)
∫
Pi
[Ast]
γdγ, z¯i0 =
1
µ(Pi)
∫
Pi
[AxN0 ]
γdγ,
s˙it = −
(
α− β
2
r
pit
)
s¯it − (1− ηpit)z¯it, s¯iT = 0.(58)
The closed loop dynamics for the ith agent under Strategy 1 in the finite
population problem is given by
x˙oit =
(
α− β
2
r
pit
)
xoit + η
1
N
N∑
j=1
aijx
oj
t +
β2
r
s¯it.(59)
Let zoNt ∈ L2[0, 1] denote the step function that corresponds to the vector
[zo1t . . . z
oN
t ]
ᵀ. Let ∆Nit , z¯it − zoit . Then
∆˙Nit =
(
α− β
2
r
pit
)
∆Nit +
β2
r
1
µ(Pi)
∫
Pi
[
Ast −ANs¯t
]γ
dγ,
+ η
1
µ(Pi)
∫
Pi
[
Azt −ANzoNt
]γ
dγ
=
(
α− β
2
r
pit
)
∆Nit +
β2
r
1
µ(Pi)
〈
1Pi , (A−AN)st
〉
,
+ η
1
µ(Pi)
〈
1Pi , (A−AN)zt
〉
+ η
1
N
N∑
j=1
aij∆
Nj
t .
i
i
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Therefore,
(60) ∆˙Nt =
[
(α− β
2
r
pit)I +
η
N
AN
]
∆Nt +
β2
r
DNst + ηD
Nz
t
where
DNst =
(
1
µ(Pi)
〈
1Pi , (A−AN)st
〉)N
i=1
∈ RN ,
DNzt =
(
1
µ(Pi)
〈
1Pi , (A−AN)zt
〉)N
i=1
∈ RN .
The initial condition is given by ∆N0 = [∆
N1
0 , . . . ,∆
NN
0 ]
ᵀ where
(61) ∆Ni0 = z¯
i
0 − zoi0 =
1
µ(Pi)
〈
1Pi , (A−AN)xN0
〉
.
We want to ensure that ‖∆Nt ‖∞ , maxi{|∆Nit |} is bounded and establish
the rate of convergence with respect to N . The solution {∆Nt , t ∈ [0, T ]} to
(60) with the initial condition specified by (61) is given as follows:
(62) ∆Nt = Φ(t, 0)∆
N
0 +
∫ t
0
Φ(t, τ)
(β2
r
DNsτ + ηD
Nz
t
)
dτ.
By the definition of ‖ · ‖∞, we obtain
(63)
‖∆Nt ‖∞ ≤ ‖Φ(t, 0)‖∞ ‖∆N0 ‖∞ +
∫ t
0
∥∥∥∥Φ(t, τ)(β2r DNsτ + ηDNzτ )
∥∥∥∥
∞
dτ
≤
∥∥∥Φ(t, 0)∥∥∥
∞
EN‖xN0 ‖2 +
∫ t
0
‖Φ(t, τ)‖∞EN
(β2
r
‖sτ‖2 + |η|‖zτ‖2
)
dτ
where EN , max1≤i≤N 1µ(Pi)
∥∥(A−AN)1Pi∥∥2 . Furthermore, ‖Φ(t, τ)‖∞ with
t ≥ τ is uniformly bounded in N since
(64) ‖Φ(t, τ)‖∞ = Γ(t, τ)
∥∥∥e(t−τ) ηNA∥∥∥
∞
≤ Γ(t, τ)e(t−τ)|η|c
where |aij | ≤ c as in Assumption 4. Since ‖Φ(t, τ)‖∞, ‖xN0 ‖2, ‖sτ‖2 and
‖zτ‖2 are all uniformly bounded in N , (63) implies
(65) ‖∆Nt ‖∞ ∼ O
(
EN
)
.
Hence, by the definition of I2, for fixed T > 0,
(66) I2 ∼ O
(
E2N
)
.
i
i
“Linear˙Quadratic˙Graphon˙Field˙Games” — 2020/6/9 — 1:52 — page 27 — #27 i
i
i
i
i
i
Linear Quadratic Graphon Field Games 27
7.2.2. Estimate for I3. Similarly, letting δ
Ni
t , z¯it − xoit we obtain
(67)
δ˙Nit =(α−
β2
r
pit)δ
Ni
t +
β2
r
[
1
µ(Pi)
∫
Pi
[
Ast
]γ
dγ − s¯it
]
+ η
 1
µ(Pi)
∫
Pi
[Azt]
γdγ − 1
N
N∑
j=1
aijx
oj
t

=(α− β
2
r
pit)δ
Ni
t +
β2
r
1
µ(Pi)
〈(A− I)1Pi , st〉
+ η
1
µ(Pi)
〈(A− I)1Pi , zt〉+ η∆Nit .
Therefore,
δNit = Γ(t, 0)δ
Ni
0 +
∫ t
0
Γ(t, τ)
β2
r
1
µ(Pi)
〈(A− I)1Pi , sτ 〉dτ
+
∫ t
0
Γ(t, τ)
η
µ(Pi)
〈(A− I)1Pi , zτ 〉dτ +
∫ t
0
Γ(t, τ)η∆Niτ dτ
≤ Γ(t, 0)‖A− I‖op‖xN0 ‖2
+
∫ t
0
Γ(t, τ)‖(A− I)‖op
(β2
r
‖sτ‖2 + η‖zτ‖2
)
dτ +
∫ t
0
Γ(t, τ)η∆Niτ dτ
with the initial condition
δNi0 = z¯
i
0 − xoi0 =
1
µ(Pi)
〈(A− I)1Pi ,xN0 〉.
Furthermore, since xN0 , zt, st, A, ‖A− I‖op are uniformly bounded in N
and ∆Nit is of the order EN for all i, we obtain |δNit | ∼ max {O(1), O(EN )} .
This together with (53) and (66) implies
(68) I3 ∼ max
{
O
(
EN
)
, O
(
E2N
)}
.
7.2.3. Estimates for I′2 and I
′
3. By Assumption 4, I
′
2 = I2. Thus
(69) I ′2 ∼ O(E2N )
Similar to (68), we obtain
(70) I ′3 ∼ max
{
O(EN ), O(E
2
N )
}
.
i
i
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7.2.4. Completion of the proof.
Hence (55), (66), (68), (69) and (70), together with Lemma 1, imply that
(71) J(u
oi, u−oi)− inf
ui∈U
J(ui, u−oi) ∼ max{O(EN ), O(E2N )} .

7.2.5. Lemma for Theorem 2.
Let xoi, i ∈ {1, ..., N}, denotes the state trajectory of agent j when all
agents are following Strategy 1. Assume the following trajectories are given
to an arbitrary agent indexed by i:
• the reference trajectory z¯it , 1µ(Pi)
∫
Pi
zγt dγ for all t ∈ [0, T ] with z as
the graphon filed of the corresponding limit graphon field game prob-
lem satisfying (15)
• the dynamic offset zoit , 1N
∑
j∈Ni aijx
oj
t for all t ∈ [0, T ] where Ni
denotes the set of neighours for agent i excluding itself.
Then consider the following linear quadratic tracking problem for agent i:
(72)
x˙it = αx
i
t + βu
i
t + η
1
N
∑
j∈Ni
aijx
oj
t
J(ui, z¯i) =
1
2
∫ T
0
[
(xit − z¯it)2 + r(uit)2
]
dt.
Lemma 1. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4, the following estimate for
the difference between costs based on different control laws for the problem
in (72) holds
(73) J(uoi, z¯i)− inf
ui∈U
J(ui, z¯i) ∼ O
(
EN
)
,
where uoi is generated based on Strategy 1, U , L2([0, T ];R) and EN ,
max1≤i≤N 1µ(Pi)
∥∥(A−AN)1Pi∥∥2.
i
i
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Proof. The optimal control law for the problem (72) is given by
u∗it = −
β
r
pitx
∗i
t +
β
r
s∗it ,(74)
−p˙it = 2αpit − β
2
r
pi2t + 1, piT = 0,(75)
−s˙∗it =
(
α− β
2
r
pit
)
s∗it + z¯
i
t − ηpitzoit , s∗iT = 0,(76)
The dynamics and cost under the optimal control are respectively given by
x˙∗it = αx
∗i
t + βu
∗i
t + η
1
N
∑
j∈Ni
aijx
oj
t(77)
J(u∗i, z¯i) =
1
2
∫ T
0
[
(x∗it − z¯it)2 + r(u∗it )2
]
dt.(78)
On the other hand, the control following Strategy 1 is given by
(79) uoit = −
β
r
pitx
oi
t +
β
r
s¯it
with s¯i defined as in (27) and pi(·) given by (75). Assumptions 1, 2 and 3
ensure that s¯i always exists. The associated dynamics and cost for agent i
are then respectively given by
x˙oit = αx
oi
t + βu
oi
t + η
1
N
∑
j∈Ni
aijx
oj
t(80)
J(uoi, z¯i) =
1
2
∫ T
0
[
(xoit − z¯it)2 + r(uoit )2
]
dt.(81)
Based on the definition of s¯it in (27) and that of z¯
i
t, it is obvious that
(82) ˙¯sit = −
(
α− β
2
r
pit
)
s¯it − (1− ηpit)z¯it, s¯iT = 0.
This together with (76) yields
(83)
d(s¯it − s∗it )
dt
= −
(
α− β
2
r
pit
)
(s¯it − s∗it ) + ηpit(z¯it − zoit ).
Let ∆Nit , z¯it − zoit . Then (s¯it − s∗it ) =
∫ t
T Γ(t, τ)ηpiτ∆
Ni
τ dτ and
(84) (s¯it − s∗it ) ∼ O
(
EN
)
, i ∈ {1, ..., N}.
i
i
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By comparing the following closed-loop dynamics under these two different
control laws, we obtain
d(xoit − x∗it )
dt
=
(
α− β
2
r
pit
)
(xoit − x∗it ) +
β2
r
(s¯it − s∗it ), xoi0 − x∗i0 = 0.
Therefore, the difference is explicitly obtained as
(85) xoit − x∗it =
ηβ2
r
∫ t
0
Γ(t, τ)
(∫ τ
T
Γ(τ, q)ηpiq∆
Ni
q dq
)
dτ.
Under Assumption 4,
∑N
j=1 aijx
oj =
∑
j∈Ni aijx
oj for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Then
the result from (65) applies here, that is, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], |∆Nit | ∼ O
(
EN
)
. Hence
for any t ∈ [0, T ], |(xoit − x∗it )| ∼ O
(
EN
)
. This, together with (84), implies
|(uoit − u∗it )| ∼ O
(
EN
)
. Hence
∣∣J(uoi, z¯i)− J(u∗i, z¯i)∣∣ ∼ O(EN), that is, we
obtain (73).

7.3. Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Let zγt ,
∑d
`=1 z
`
t f`(γ), γ ∈ [γ, γ] ⊂ [0, 1], be the Local Graphon Field
calculated based on Strategy 2 and zγ denote its trajectory over time [0, T ].
For Pi ⊂ [0, 1], let z¯it , 1µ(Pi)
∫
Pi
zγt dγ and z¯
γ
t , z¯it, γ ∈ Pi. Let z¯i and z¯
respectively denote their trajectories over time [0, T ]. Similarly we define
s¯t, s¯
i
t, s¯ and s¯
i.
For agent i that corresponds to Pi ⊂ [0, 1], the cost induced by following
the limit control law is given by
J(uoi, u−oi) =
1
2
E
∫ T
0
(
(xoit −
1
N
N∑
j=1
aijx
oj
t )
2 + r(uoit )
2
)
dt
= J(uoi, z¯i) +
1
2
E
∫ T
0
[
(z¯it −
1
N
N∑
j=1
aijx
oj
t )
]2
(uoi,u−oi)
dt
+ E
∫ T
0
[
(xoit − z¯it)(z¯it −
1
N
N∑
j=1
aijx
oj
t )
]
(uoi,u−oi)
dt
, J(uoi, z¯i) + 1
2
I2 +
1
2
I3,
i
i
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where xoit and u
oi
t represent respectively the state and control for agent i at
time t under the prescribed ε-Nash law. By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
we obtain
(86) I3 ≤ 2
√
I2
[
E
∫ T
0
(xoit − z¯it)2dt
] 1
2
(uoi,u−oi)
.
Let J(ui, u−oi) denote the cost for agent i by unilaterally deviating from
the prescribed ε-Nash law where all other agents following the prescribed
ε-Nash law. Then
J(ui, u−oi) =
1
2
E
∫ T
0
(
(xit −
1
N
N∑
j=1
aijx
j
t )
2 + r(uit)
2
)
(ui,u−oi)
dt
= J(ui, z¯i) +
1
2
E
∫ T
0
[
(z¯it −
1
N
N∑
j=1
aijx
j
t )
]2
(ui,u−oi)
dt
+ E
∫ T
0
[
(xit − z¯it)(z¯it −
1
N
N∑
j=1
aijx
j
t )
]
(ui,u−oi)
dt
, J(ui, z¯i) + 1
2
I ′2 +
1
2
I ′3.
Similarly,
(87) I ′3 ≤ 2
√
I ′2
[
E
∫ T
0
(xit − z¯it)2dt
] 1
2
(ui,u−oi)
.
Therefore, we obtain the following:
(88)
J(uoi, u−oi)− J(ui, u−oi)
= J(uoi, u−oi)− J(uoi, z¯i) + J(uoi, z¯i)− J(ui, z¯i) + J(ui, z¯i)− J(ui, u−oi)
≤ 1
2
(I2 + I3) +
(
J(uoi, z¯i)− J(ui, z¯i))+ 1
2
(I ′2 + I
′
3).
7.3.1. Estimate for I2. The next step is to show the upper bound for
the term I2:
(89) I2 , E
∫ T
0
[
(z¯it −
1
N
N∑
j=1
aijx
oj
t )
]2
(uoi,u−oi)
dt.
i
i
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Similar to the deterministic case, we obtain
˙¯zit =
(
α− β
2
r
pit
)
z¯it + η
1
µ(Pi)
∫
Pi
[Azt]
γdγ +
β2
r
1
µ(Pi)
∫
Pi
[Ast]
γdγ,(90)
z¯i0 =
1
µ(Pi)
∫
Pi
[Aµ1]γdγ,
˙¯sit = −
(
α− β
2
r
pit
)
s¯it − (1− ηpit)z¯it, s¯iT = 0.(91)
The closed loop dynamics for the finite population problem is given by
x˙oit =
(
α− β
2
r
pit
)
xoit + η
1
N
N∑
j=1
aijx
oj
t +
β2
r
s¯it,(92)
Let zoNt ∈ L2[0, 1] denote the step function that corresponds to the vector
[zo1t . . . z
oN
t ]
ᵀ via N -uniform partition. Then
(93) z˙oNt =
(
α− β
2
r
pit
)
zoNt + ηA
NzoNt +
β2
r
ANs¯it, z
oN
0 = A
Nµ1.
Let ∆Nit , z¯it − zoit .
∆˙Nit =
(
α− β
2
r
pit
)
∆Nit +
β2
r
1
µ(Pi)
〈
1Pi , (A−AN)st
〉
,
+ η
1
µ(Pi)
〈
1Pi , (A−AN)zt
〉
+ η
1
N
N∑
j=1
aij∆
Nj
t .
Therefore,
(94) ∆˙Nt =
[
(α− β
2
r
pit)I +
η
N
A
]
∆Nt +
β2
r
DNst + ηD
Nz
t
where
DNst =
(
1
µ(Pi)
〈
1Pi , (A−AN)st
〉)N
i=1
∈ RN ,
DNzt =
(
1
µ(Pi)
〈
1Pi , (A−AN)zt
〉)N
i=1
∈ RN .
i
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By the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality,
(95)
DNis (t) ,
1
µ(Pi)
〈
1Pi , (A−AN)st
〉
≤ EN‖st‖2,
DNiz (t) ,
1
µ(Pi)
〈
1Pi , (A−AN)zt
〉
≤ EN‖zt‖2.
The initial condition is given by ∆N0 = [∆
N1
0 , . . . ,∆
NN
0 ]
ᵀ where
(96)
∆Ni0 = z¯
i
0 − zoi0 =
1
µ(Pi)
〈1Pi ,Aµ1−ANxN0 〉
=
1
µ(Pi)
〈1Pi ,A(1µ− xN0 )〉+
1
µ(Pi)
〈1Pi , (A−AN)xN0 〉.
The solution {∆Nt , t ∈ [0, T ]} to (96) is given by
(97) ∆Nt = Φ(t, 0)∆
N
0 +
∫ t
0
Φ(t, τ)
(β2
r
DNsτ + ηD
Nz
t
)
dτ.
Taking the expectation of (96) yields
E∆Ni0 =
1
µ(Pi)
〈1Pi , (A−AN)µ1〉 =
1
µ(Pi)
〈(A−AN)1Pi , µ1〉,
Hence by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality
(98) |E∆Ni0 | ≤
1
µ(Pi)
‖(A−AN)1Pi‖2|µ| = |µ|EN .
Taking the expectation of (97) yields
(99) E∆Nt =Φ(t, 0)E∆
N
0 +
∫ t
0
Φ(t, τ)
(β2
r
DNsτ + ηD
Nz
t
)
dτ.
Following a similar argument in the deterministic case in (63),
(100) ‖E∆Nt ‖∞ = max
i
E∆Nit ∼ O(EN ).
The variance of ∆Ni0 , i ∈ {1, ..., N}, satisfies the following
var(∆Ni0 ) = E
[
1
µ(Pi)
〈1Pi ,AN(µ1− xN0 )〉
]2
= E
 1
N
N∑
j=1
aij(x
j
0 − µ)
2 ≤ 1
N
σ2c2
i
i
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where c = maxi,j |aij |. Furthermore,
E(∆Ni0 − E∆Ni0 )(∆Nj0 − E∆Nj0 ) ≤
1
N
σ2c2, ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Note that
(101) var(∆N0 ) =
AN
N
var(xN0 )
AN
N
ᵀ
=
AN
N
diag(σ2, . . . , σ2)
AN
N
ᵀ
and
(102) E
[
∆N0 ∆
N
0
ᵀ]
= var(∆N0 ) + E∆
N
0 E∆
N
0
ᵀ
.
From (97) and (102), we obtain
(103)
E
[
∆Nt ∆
N
t
ᵀ]
= Φ(t, 0)
(
var(∆N0 )
)
Φ(t, 0)
ᵀ
+ Φ(t, 0)
(
E∆N0 E∆
N
0
ᵀ)
Φ(t, 0)
ᵀ
+ E∆N0 ·
[∫ t
0
Φ(t, τ)
(β2
r
DNsτ + ηD
Nz
t
)
dτ
]ᵀ
+
[∫ t
0
Φ(t, τ)
(β2
r
DNsτ + ηD
Nz
t
)
dτ
]
· E∆N0
ᵀ
+
[∫ t
0
Φ(t, τ)
(β2
r
DNsτ + ηD
Nz
t
)
dτ
] [∫ t
0
Φ(t, τ)
(β2
r
DNsτ + ηD
Nz
t
)
dτ
]ᵀ
, Y1 + Y2 + Y3 + Y4 + Y5.
The first part of (103) sastisfies:
(104)
|[Y1]ii| =
∣∣∣∣[Φ(t, 0)ANN diag(σ2, . . . , σ2)ANN
ᵀ
Φ(t, 0)
ᵀ
]
ii
∣∣∣∣
= σ2
[
Γ(t, 0)
]2 ∣∣∣∣[e( ηtN AN)ANN ANN
ᵀ
e(
ηt
N
AN)ᵀ
]
ii
∣∣∣∣
≤ σ2
[
Γ(t, 0)
]2 N∑
k=1
( c
N
ec|η|t
)2
(by Lemma 5)
=
σ2
N
[
Γ(t, 0)
]2
c2e2c|η|t.
The second part of (103) sastisfies:
|[Y2]ii| =
[
Γ(t, 0)
]2 ∣∣∣[e( ηtN AN) (E∆N0 E∆N0 ᵀ) e( ηtN AN)ᵀ]
ii
∣∣∣ ,
i
i
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where∣∣∣[e( ηtN AN) (E∆N0 E∆N0 ᵀ) e( ηtN AN)ᵀ]
ii
∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣[(e ηtN AN − I)(E∆N0 E∆N0 ᵀ)(e ηtN AN − I)ᵀ]
ii
∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣[(E∆N0 E∆N0 ᵀ) e ηtN AN ᵀ]
ii
∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣[e ηtN AN (E∆N0 E∆N0 ᵀ)]
ii
∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣[E∆N0 E∆N0 ᵀ]
ii
∣∣∣
(by Lemma 3 and Lemma 6)
≤ (e|η|ct − 1)2µ2E2N + 2(e|η|ct)µ2E2N + µ2E2N = µ2E2N (e2|η|ct + 2)
By Lemma 4 and equation (95), the third part of (103) satisfies:
(105)
∣∣[Y ᵀ3 ]ii∣∣ = ∣∣∣[ ∫ t
0
E∆N0 Γ(t, τ)e
( η(t−τ)N AN)
(β2
r
DNsτ + ηD
Nz
τ
)]ᵀ
dτ
]
ii
∣∣∣
≤ |µ|E2N
∫ t
0
Γ(t, τ)
[
e|η|(t−τ)c
(β2
r
‖sτ‖2 + η‖zτ‖2
)]ᵀ
dτ.
This same bound holds for the fourth part Y4 of (103). The last part Y5 of
(103) sastisfies:
(106)∣∣∣[Y5]
ii
∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣[ ∫ t
0
∫ t
0
Φ(t, τ)
(β2
r
DNsτ + ηD
Nz
t
)
dτ
(β2
r
DNsθ + ηD
Nz
θ
)ᵀ
Φ(t, θ)
ᵀ
dθ
]
ii
∣∣∣∣
(similar to proof for the second part Y2)
≤
∫ t
0
∫ t
0
{
(
β2
r
‖sτ‖2 + |η|‖zτ‖2)(β
2
r
‖sθ‖2 + |η|‖zθ‖2)
·
[
(e|η|c(t−τ) − 1)(e|η|c(t−θ) − 1)µ2E2N + (e|η|c(t−τ))µ2E2N
+ (e|η|c(t−θ))µ2E2N + µ
2E2N
]}
dτdθ
= µ2E2N
∫ t
0
∫ t
0
{
(
β2
r
‖sτ‖2 + |η|‖zτ‖2)(β
2
r
‖sθ‖2 + |η|‖zθ‖2)
·
[
(e|η|c(t−τ) − 1)(e|η|c(t−θ) − 1) + (e|η|c(t−τ)) + (e|η|c(t−θ)) + 1
]}
dτdθ
The above analysis for Y1, Y2, Y3, Y4 and Y5 implies that for all i ∈ {1, ..., N}
(107)
[
E
[
∆Nt ∆
N
t
ᵀ]]
ii
∼ max
{
O
( 1
N
)
,O(E2N )
}
.
i
i
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Since by definition I2 =
∫ T
0
[
E
[
∆Nt ∆
N
t
ᵀ]]
ii
dt, we obtain
(108) I2 ∼ max
{
O
( 1
N
)
,O(E2N )
}
, ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N}.
7.3.2. Estimate for I3. Setting δ
Ni
t , z¯it − xoit yields
δ˙Nit = (α−
β2
r
pit)δ
Ni
t +
β2
r
1
µ(Pi)
〈1Pi ,Ast − st〉+ η
1
µ(Pi)
〈1Pi ,Azt − zoNt 〉
= (α− β
2
r
pit)δ
Ni
t +
β2
r
1
µ(Pi)
〈(A− I)1Pi , st〉
+ η
1
µ(Pi)
〈(A− I)1Pi , zt〉+ η
1
µ(Pi)
〈1Pi , z¯t − zoNt 〉
= (α− β
2
r
pit)δ
Ni
t +
β2
r
1
µ(Pi)
〈(A− I)1Pi , st〉
+ η
1
µ(Pi)
〈(A− I)1Pi , zt〉+ η∆Nit .
Therefore,
δNit =Γ(t, 0)δ
Ni
0 +
∫ t
0
Γ(t, τ)
β2
r
1
µ(Pi)
〈(A− I)1Pi , sτ 〉dτ
+
∫ t
0
Γ(t, τ)η
1
µ(Pi)
〈(A− I)1Pi , zτ 〉dτ +
∫ t
0
Γ(t, τ)η∆Niτ dτ
≤Γ(t, 0)‖A− I‖op‖xN0 ‖2 +
∫ t
0
Γ(t, τ)‖(A− I)‖op
(β2
r
‖sτ‖2 + η‖zτ‖2
)
dτ
+
∫ t
0
Γ(t, τ)η∆Niτ dτ
with the initial condition δNi0 = z¯
i
0 − xoi0 = 1µ(Pi)1
ᵀ
Pi
A1µ− xi0. Since EδNi0 =
z¯i0 − µ and E(δNi0 )2 = (z¯i0 − µ)2 + σ2, they are uniformly bounded in N .
Then
(109)
E[δNit ]
2 =E
(
Γ(t, 0)δNi0 +
∫ t
0
Γ(t, τ)(
β2
r
Dis(τ) + ηD
i
z(τ)) + η
∫ t
0
Γ(t, τ)∆Niτ dτ
)2
.
Recall from (98) that |E∆Ni0 | ≤ |µ|EN . Therefore,
(110) E∆Nit ∆
Ni
t
ᵀ ∼ max
{
O
( 1
N
)
,O(E2N )
}
, ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N}.
i
i
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By expanding and evaluating all the terms in (109), we obtain E(δNit )
2 ∼
max
{O(1),O(E2N )}. Therefore, we obtain
(111) I3 ∼ max
{
O
( 1√
N
)
,O
(
EN
)
,O
(
E2N
)}
.
7.3.3. Estimates for I′2 and I
′
3. Next we obtain the rate of convergence
for I ′2 and I ′3. Under Assumption 4,
(112)
I ′2 = E
∫ T
0
[
(z¯it −
1
N
N∑
j=1
aijx
j
t )
]2
(ui,u−oi)
dt
= E
∫ T
0
[
(z¯it −
1
N
N∑
j=1
aijx
j
t )
]2
(uoi,u−oi)
dt.
Hence for fixed T > 0,
(113) I ′2 ∼ max
{
O
( 1
N
)
,O(E2N )
}
, ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N}.
Similarly to (68), we obtain
(114) I ′3 ∼ max
{
O
( 1√
N
)
,O
(
EN
)
,O
(
E2N
)}
.
7.3.4. Completion of the proof.
Finally (88), (108), (111), (113) and (114) together with Lemma 2 imply
that
J(uoi, u−oi)− inf
ui∈U
J(ui, u−oi) ∼ max
{
O
( 1√
N
)
,O
(
EN
)
,O
(
E2N
)}
.

7.3.5. Lemmas for Theorem 3.
Let xoi, i ∈ {1, ..., N}, denote the state trajectory of agent i when all
agents are following Strategy 2. The initial states of all agents are indepen-
dent and identically distributed N(µ, σ2). Assume the following information
is given to an arbitrary agent indexed by i:
i
i
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• the reference trajectory z¯it , 1µ(Pi)
∫
Pi
zγt dγ for all t ∈ [0, T ] with z as
the graphon filed of the corresponding limit graphon field game prob-
lem satisfying (15) where the initial condition is replace by z0 = µ1
• the dynamic offset zoit , 1N
∑
j∈Ni aijx
oj
t for all t ∈ [0, T ] where Ni
denotes the set of neighours for agent i excluding itself.
Then consider the following linear quadratic tracking problem for agent i:
(115)
x˙it = αx
i
t + βu
i
t + η
1
N
∑
j∈Ni
aijx
oj
t
J(ui, z¯i) =
1
2
E
∫ T
0
[
(xit − z¯it)2 + r(uit)2
]
dt.
where the random initial condition is distributed N(µ, σ2).
Lemma 2. Under Assumptions 1(a), 2, 3 and 4, the following estimate for
the costs in problem (115) holds when uoi is generated based on Strategy 2:
(116) J(uoi, z¯i)− inf
ui∈U
J(ui, z¯i) ∼ O
(
E2N
)
,
where U = L2([0, T ];R) and EN , max1≤i≤N 1µ(Pi)
∥∥(A−AN)1Pi∥∥2 .
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 1. The optimal control law for
the problem in (116) is given by
u∗it = −
β
r
pitx
∗i
t +
β
r
s∗it ,(117)
−p˙it = 2αpit − β
2
r
pi2t + 1, piT = 0,(118)
−s˙∗it =
(
α− β
2
r
pit
)
s∗it + z¯
i
t − ηpitzoit , s∗iT = 0.(119)
Then the corresponding dynamics and cost are given by
x˙∗it = αx
∗i
t + βu
∗i
t + η
1
N
∑
j∈Ni
aijx
oj
t(120)
J(u∗i, z¯i) =
1
2
E
∫ T
0
[
(x∗it − z¯it)2 + r(u∗it )2
]
dt(121)
i
i
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On the other hand, following Strategy 2, the response is as follows:
(122) uoit = −
β
r
pitx
oi
t +
β
r
s¯it
where s¯i is defined according to (34). Note that under Assumptions 1(a), 2
and 3, s¯i always exists. The corresponding dynamics and cost are given by
x˙oit = αx
oi
t + βu
oi
t + η
1
N
∑
j∈Ni
aijx
oj
t ,(123)
J(uoi, z¯i) =
1
2
E
∫ T
0
[
(xoit − z¯it)2 + r(uoit )2
]
dt(124)
Based on (15) and the definitions of s¯i and z¯i, we obtain
˙¯sit = −
(
α− β
2
r
pit
)
s¯it − (1− ηpit)z¯it, s¯iT = 0.(125)
This together with (119) yields
(126)
d(s¯it − s∗it )
dt
= −
(
α− β
2
r
pit
)
(s¯it − s∗it ) + ηpit(z¯it − zoit ).
Let ∆Nit , z¯it − zoit . Then for all i ∈ {1, ..., N},
(127) (s¯it − s∗it ) =
∫ t
T
Γ(t, τ)ηpiτ∆
Ni
τ dτ.
Under Assumption 4,
∑
j∈Ni aijx
j
t =
∑N
j=1 aijx
j
t and hence the result in
(110) applies here. That is, for any t ∈ [0, T ],
(128) E(∆Nit )
2 ∼ max
{
O
( 1
N
)
,O(E2N )
}
.
This together with (127) implies
(129) E(s¯it − s∗it )2 ∼ max
{
O
( 1
N
)
,O(E2N )
}
.
Comparing closed-loop dynamics under the two different control laws yields
d(xoit − x∗it )
dt
=
(
α− β
2
r
pit
)
(xoit − x∗it ) +
β2
r
(s¯it − s∗it ), xoi0 − x∗i0 = 0.
i
i
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The difference is explicitly given by
(130)
xoit − x∗it =
∫ t
0
Γ(t, τ)
β2
r
(s¯iτ − s∗iτ )dτ
=
ηβ2
r
∫ t
0
Γ(t, τ)
[∫ τ
T
Γ(τ, q)ηpiq∆
Ni
q dq
]
dτ.
Under Assumption 4,
∑
j∈Ni aijx
j
t =
∑N
j=1 aijx
j
t and the result from (100)
applies here, i.e.,
∀t ∈ [0, T ], ‖E∆Nt ‖∞ = max
i
|E∆Nit | ∼ O(EN ).
This together with (130) and (127) implies
(131) |E(xoit − x∗it )| ∼ O(EN ) and |E(s¯it − s∗it )| ∼ O(EN ).
Therefore, by the construction of the two control laws, we obtain
(132) |E(uoit − u∗it )| ∼ O(EN ).
Equations (128), (129) and (130) imply that
(133) E(xoit − x∗it )2 ∼ max
{
O
( 1
N
)
,O(E2N )
}
.
This together with (129) implies
(134) E(uoit − u∗it )2 ∼ max
{
O
( 1
N
)
,O(E2N )
}
by the construction of the two control laws. We observe that
(135)
J(u∗i, z¯i) =
1
2
E
∫ T
0
[
(x∗it − xoit + xoit − z¯it)2 + r(u∗it − uoit + uoit )2
]
dt
= J(uoi, z¯i) +
1
2
E
∫ T
0
[
(x∗it − xoit )2 + r(u∗it − uoit )2
]
dt
+
∫ T
0
[
E[x∗it − xoit ](xoit − z¯it) + rE[u∗it − uoit ](uoit )
]
dt.
Therefore, based on (131), (132), (133), (134) and (135), we obtain
(136)
∣∣J(uoi, z¯i)− J(u∗i, z¯i)∣∣ ∼ max{O( 1
N
)
,O(EN ),O(E2N )
}
that is, (116) holds.
i
i
“Linear˙Quadratic˙Graphon˙Field˙Games” — 2020/6/9 — 1:52 — page 41 — #41 i
i
i
i
i
i
Linear Quadratic Graphon Field Games 41

Lemma 3. If |aik| ≤ ca and |bkj | ≤ cb for all i, k ∈ {1, 2 . . . , N}, j ∈ {1, . . . ,M}
with N,M ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, then the following inequality
∣∣∣[eη ANB]ij∣∣∣ ≤ cbeca|η|
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, j ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, where A = [aik] and B = [bkj ].
Proof.
(137)
∣∣∣[eη ANB]ij∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣[(eη AN − I)B +B]ij∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣[(η A
N
+ η2
A2
N2
1
2!
+ . . .)B
]
ij
∣∣∣+ cb
=
∣∣∣ N∑
k=1
[
η
A
N
+ η2
A2
N2
1
2!
+ . . .
]
ik
bkj
∣∣∣+ cb
≤ cb
N∑
k=1
∣∣∣[η A
N
+ η2
A2
N2
1
2!
+ . . .
]
ik
∣∣∣+ cb
≤ cbN
(
|η|ca
N
+ |η|2 c
2
a
N
1
2!
+ . . .
)
+ cb
= cb(e
ca|η| − 1) + cb = cbeca|η|.

Applications of Lemma 3 yield the following results.
Lemma 4. If |aij | ≤ ca and |vi| ≤ cv for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, where v ∈
RN , then |[eη AN v]i| ≤ cve|η|ca for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, where A = [aij ].
Lemma 5. If |aij | ≤ c for all i, j ∈ {1, 2 . . . , N}, then
∣∣∣∣[eη AN AN ]ij
∣∣∣∣ ≤ cN ec|η|
for all i, j ∈ {1, 2 . . . , N}, where A = [aij ].
Lemma 6. Let W = [wij ], A = [aij ] ∈ RN×N . If |wij | ≤ cw and |aij | ≤ ca
for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, then the following inequalities hold:
(138)
∣∣∣∣[(eη AN − I)W]ij
∣∣∣∣ ≤ (e|η|ca − 1)cw,∣∣∣∣[(eη AN − I)W (eη AN − I)ᵀ]ij
∣∣∣∣ ≤ (e|η|ca − 1)2cw.
i
i
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